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Tragedy, Revisited ... Again 
Ryan Irwin 
Just as there can be no explanation in 
history without a story, so too there can 
be no story without a plot by which to 
make of it a story of a particular kind. 
-Hayden Whitel 
As a historian, Williams wished for 
an America whose ideals, as he under-
stood them, were never compromised 
by the behavior of the leadership. He 
never seems to have sensed that if he 
were cogent in his exploration of the 
motivating forces in the history of the 
republic, there was something foolish 
or perverse in his exhortations for 
Americans to take a different path. 
-Bruce Kuklick2 
Being asked to say something original about an academic icon is never easy, especially when 
you're the scholarly equivalent of a 
peon. To be honest, I nave a hard time 
even imagining what a conversation 
between William Appleman 
Williams and me would look like. 
I would probably begin with some 
painfully awkward self-introduction, 
like "Hello, Professor Williams, my 
name is Ryan. I'm, umm, I'm an 
historian too." It would be one of 
those halting exchanges that demand 
long, embarrassing pauses, and a 
follow-up like "Can I call you Bill?" 
In all candor, I have no idea what 
Professor Williams was like in real 
life, but I can visualize only one 
response. He would look at me dead 
in the eyes with a pipe in his teeth or 
a cigarette dangling from his lips-I 
don't know if he actually smoked, 
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but he would do this for several, 
very dramatic moments-before 
responding finally, "No, no you may 
not. And Ryan ... You're not as good 
as you think you are." 
Perhaps my introduction would 
get better with practice, but I'd like 
to think the response would remain 
the same. The words just jump out 
whenever I hear his name. William 
Appleman Williams-this towering, 
semi-mythical intellectual with a 
singular message: "America, you 
may think that you're a big deal, 
that you're a beneficent and noble 
superpower, but in real life, the place 
wfiere economics matter and politics 
are nasty, your leaders are just like 
everybody else-and by everybody 
else I'm talking about Europe." 
Admittedly, tne thesis doesn't pack 
as much raw emotional power as 
it probably did in the early sixties, 
but it still works. It taps into some 
underlying, semi-universal truth 
about life-the idea that the stories 
we tell ourselves about ourselves 
just aren't true. And what makes 
Williams's version of this argument 
all the more powerful, in ill)' opinion, 
is that he then couples it with a 
rejoinder that suggests, in essence, 
that if we wanted to, if we just tried 
hard enough, we could in fact be 
our imagined versions of ourselves. 
The only thing stopping us is the 
ridiculous, unfounded notion that 
market expansion will solve all our 
problems. It's just plain tragic. 
This essay is supposed to provide 
a "graduate student perspective" on 
The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, 
celebrating the book's fiftieth 
anniversary while commenting on 
its relevance to the contemporary 
field. In other words, I should try 
to say something that can pass for 
semi-intelligent, generationally aware 
commentary on this very famous 
thesis. I will take two swings and 
pass the bat feebly to my neighbor. 
First, The Tragedy of American 
Diplomacy is unusual by today's 
standards. The book reads more like 
a philosophical statement on America 
tnan a traditional monograph of U.S. 
foreign relations history. On the one 
hand, it is confident in a way that 
historians aren't really allowed to 
be anymore. Just look at the chapter 
titles: "Imperial Anticolonialism," 
"The Imperialism of Idealism" 
and "The Impotence of Nuclear 
Supremacy." I won't throw anyone 
in particular under the bus here, but 
I will say that I certainly don't have 
that type of rhetorical creativity. 
Then there is the prose. "If it could 
be done, [Wilson] was confident that 
American economic power could take 
care of the United States-and the 
world" (91). If I tried to say something 
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so unequivocal in a seminar paper 
today I would probably get a big 
fat question mark in tne margins, 
followed by an exclamation like 
"evidence!" or "historiography!" 
The rrofession 
has changed. 
oranges-you look at government 
elites, I look at Mexican farmers-
historiography is a fruit basket. The 
oranges don't technically have more 
intrinsic value than the apples. 
Anyway, that's 
swing numero 
People make 
this observation 
all the time, but 
Williams was a 
Richard Hofstadter-
type historian; 
ne talked not just 
to the historical 
profession but to 
America as a whole. 
His ideas were 
big and clean and 
rrovocative, and 
they were meant 
both to persuade 
William Appleman Williams-
this towering, semi-mythical 
intellectual with a singular 
message: "America, you 
may think that you're a big 
deal, that you're a beneficent 
and noble superpower, but 
in real life, tne place where 
economics matter and politics 
are nasty, your leaders are just 
like everybody else-and by 
uno. My second 
argument, I 
suppose, takes this 
point into the deep 
end of the pool. 
Stated plainly, and a 
little bit tentatively, 
The Tragedy of 
American Diplomacy 
is wrong. I would 
love to pitch this 
as some sort of 
generationally everybody else I'm talking 
about Europe." hip post-9/11 
statement, but 
us to change our 
views about our 
past and adjust our attitudes about 
our present. They hearken, ultimately, 
back to a time when historians could 
call their country "her" and have 
their peers-who happened to all be 
white Anglo-Saxon Protestant men-
say sometbing other than "Man, that 
guy's a misogynistic meta-jerk." 
On the other hand-or maybe on 
the flip side of the same hand-it's 
hard to miss the fact that The 
Tragedy of American Diplomacy 
has no footnotes. It is probably 
not a mistake that people-and 
here I am admittedly thinking of 
myself-typically reference Walter 
LaFeber, Lloyd Gardner, and 
Thomas McCormick when they 
want to discuss revisionism as a 
school of thought. Would William 
Appleman Williams be William 
Appleman Williams without the 
scholars who came after him (and 
provided the evidence-based case 
studies that gave his argument 
such lasting interpretive power)? I 
have no idea, but I don't think it's 
an exaggeration to say that much of 
the work since Tragedy-or at least 
during that period between the 
sixties and early nineties-was a fight 
over Williams's footnotes. And the 
opposition admittedly landed some 
solid punches. For instance, can you 
really put Tragedy next to Melvyn 
Leffler's A Preponderance of Power and 
walk away thinking that Williams 
nailed the "origins" debate? Many of 
the arguments of the post-Tragedy 
era-call them post-revisionist or 
liberal realist or neo-strategicalist 
or whatever you want-resound 
because they capture something 
about the archival materials 
historians find when they visit 
College Park and other government 
archives. Even if we are ultimately 
talking about interpretive apples and 
when I explained 
my thinking 
to my friends they all said I was 
wrong. So maybe I'll step back from 
the statement a little (wrong, after 
all, turns out to be the rhetorical 
equivalent of a slap in the face), 
and say instead that if you take 
sociologist Karl Mannneim even a 
little bit seriously-accepting his 
notion that modern societies can 
be ideologically grouped in terms 
of anarchism, conservativism, 
liberalism, and radicalism-then 
Williams's work fits too cleanly into 
one category. He's a semi-romantic 
radical's radical (using Mannheim's 
epistemological definitions, of 
course). Therefore, if you argue that 
Williams's diagnosis was an accurate 
reflection of the historical record, 
that America was, in fact, driven by 
economic impulses that prevented 
it from being "good," then you have 
essentially e1evated one particular 
ideological roadmap to an objective 
reality. Use whatever terminology 
you prefer-lumping, directional 
theorizing, mecnanical plotting, 
synthetic thinking, or just plain 
old-fashioned storytelling-but, 
like the work of most of the great 
philosopher-historians, Williams's 
analysis doesn't jibe well with 
the teachings of our postmodern 
era. I don't mean to deny the 
argumentative beauty of The Tragedy 
of American Diplomacy or conflate a 
term like "wrong" with "bad." But 
the book has ideological blinders. It 
wants to change the world-it wants 
a better America. 
So what's wrong with that? 
Depending on your age and/or 
political proclivities, nothing and 
everything, I suppose. What would 
happen if the United States did 
isolate itself from the world and 
repent for the sins of the open door 
philosophy? Would the world be a 
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better place? Would America be a 
better place? I imagine half of us 
would say "Heck, yeah!" and the 
other half "Hell no!" and the point 
here isn't so much that there is a 
right or wrong answer but that the 
answer itself says as much about you 
and me-where we grew up, what 
we believe, and how we think about 
our country-as it does America. You 
could ground this statement in all 
sorts of different scholarships, but it 
will always come back to the same 
point. The world is interconnected 
in strange, multi-directional, and 
unexpected ways, with nation-states 
functioning as merely one entity 
in a sea of overlapping, conflicting 
interests, and elite benavior, along 
with the imperatives that shape 
that behavior, looks a lot different 
when you are in the White House 
than when you are on the sidelines 
of a pleasant academic town like 
Madison, Wisconsin. It would be so 
easy, for instance, if we could say, 
with a straight face, that the current 
global financial meltdown is the 
result of the dynamics unveiled 
in Williams's Tragedy. But on some 
level we all know better. I sat 
through a lecture recently where the 
speaker-Paul Solman from PBS's 
"NewsHour"-started asking the 
audience to recall their mindsets as 
their home values skyrocketed in the 
early 2000s, and this little old lady, 
an archetypical grandmother, raised 
her hand right at the most dramatic 
moment of the discussion and stated 
with the matter-of-fact sincerity 
that stays with you late at night, "I 
wanted more." My point is this: there 
are no grandmotners in Williams's 
America. Only tragic leaders who 
make tragic decisions. 
Which takes this story back to 
my initial, imagined exchange with 
Professor Williams. For I suppose if 
I were a bolder version of myself-
someone more ensconced in the 
particularities of my millennia! 
generation-the conversation 
wouldn't end with me sulking over 
my own inadequacies. I would wait, 
like some academic version of John 
Cusack's character in the movie High 
Fidelity, until my version of Professor 
Williams turned to walk away, and 
I would mutter just loud enough for 
him to actually hear me and with 
that Jon Stewartesque intonation 
that manages to be ironical, self-
deprecating, and self-aware all at the 
same time, "Well, Professor, maybe 
you're right, but you're not as good as 
you think you are either. None of us 
are." And I'll mean it, not in a snarky, 
mean-spirited sort of way but in the 
philosophically honest way. Because 
all tragedies, ultimately, lie in the eye 
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of the beholder. Then I suppose I'd 
snap back to reality. Because the next 
part-where I would run as fast as I 
could out of the room, watching my 
tenureless career crash down on my 
heels-wouldn't be pretty. 
Ryan Irwin is a Ph.D. candidate at Ohio 
State University. He is currently a pre-
doctoral fellow at Yale University. 
Notes: 
1. Bruce Kuklick, "William Appleman 
Williams and His Interpreters," 
Diplomatic History 21 (4): 666. 
2. I say this, of course, knowing full 
well that William Appleman Williams 
was responsible for the authorship of 
more than just The Tragedy of American 
Diplomacy and that many of these 
other works had copious footnotes and 
abundant archival evidence. Think of 
this observation as more a metaphorical 
rumination than a literal statement. 
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